Optimal Monetary Policy Under Uncertainty in DSGE Models: A Markov Jump-Linear-Quadratic Approach by Lars E.O. Svensson & Noah Williams


















OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY UNDER 













                                                 
 La serie de Documentos de Trabajo en versión PDF puede obtenerse gratis en la dirección electrónica:  
http://www.bcentral.cl/esp/estpub/estudios/dtbc.  Existe la posibilidad de solicitar una copia 
impresa con un costo de $500 si es dentro de Chile y US$12 si es para fuera de Chile. Las solicitudes se 
pueden hacer por fax: (56-2) 6702231 o a través de correo electrónico: bcch@bcentral.cl. 
 
Working Papers in PDF format can be downloaded free of charge from: 
http://www.bcentral.cl/eng/stdpub/studies/workingpaper. Printed versions can be ordered 
individually for US$12 per copy (for orders inside Chile the charge is Ch$500.) Orders can be placed by 
fax: (56-2) 6702231 or e-mail: bcch@bcentral.cl. 
Lars E.O. Svensson Noah Williams 
BANCO CENTRAL DE CHILE 
 




La serie Documentos de Trabajo es una publicación del Banco Central de Chile que 
divulga los trabajos de investigación económica realizados por profesionales de esta 
institución o encargados por ella a terceros. El objetivo de la serie es aportar al debate 
temas relevantes y presentar nuevos enfoques en el análisis de los mismos. La difusión 
de los Documentos de Trabajo sólo intenta facilitar el intercambio de ideas y dar a 
conocer investigaciones, con carácter preliminar, para su discusión y comentarios. 
 
La publicación de los Documentos de Trabajo no está sujeta a la aprobación previa de 
los miembros del Consejo del Banco Central de Chile. Tanto el contenido de los 
Documentos de Trabajo como también los análisis y conclusiones que de ellos se 
deriven, son de exclusiva responsabilidad de su o sus autores y no reflejan 




The Working Papers series of the Central Bank of Chile disseminates economic 
research conducted by Central Bank staff or third parties under the sponsorship of the 
Bank. The purpose of the series is to contribute to the discussion of relevant issues and 
develop new analytical or empirical approaches in their analyses. The only aim of the 
Working Papers is to disseminate preliminary research for its discussion and comments. 
 
Publication of Working Papers is not subject to previous approval by the members of 
the Board of the Central Bank. The views and conclusions presented in the papers are 
exclusively those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the position of the 





Documentos de Trabajo del Banco Central de Chile 
Working Papers of the Central Bank of Chile 
Agustinas 1180 
Teléfono: (56-2) 6702475; Fax: (56-2) 6702231 
 
 
 Documento de Trabajo  Working Paper 
N° 484  N° 484 
 
OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY UNDER UNCERTAINTY 










Este trabajo estudia el diseño de política monetaria óptima bajo incertidumbre en un 
modelo de equilibrio general dinámico y estocástico. Se utiliza un enfoque de Markov 
jump-linear-quadratic (MJLQ) para estudiar el diseño de la política, aproximando la 
incertidumbre por medio de distintos modelos discretos de cadenas de Markov, y 
tomando aproximaciones lineales cuadráticas dependientes de la moda del modelo 
subyacente. Esto nos permite aplicar una metodología poderosa, con algoritmos de 
solución convenientes que hemos desarrollado. Aplicamos nuestros métodos al modelo 
neokeynesiano básico, analizando cómo se ven afectadas las políticas por la 







We study the design of optimal monetary policy under uncertainty in a dynamic 
stochastic general equilibrium model. We use a Markov jump-linear-quadratic (MJLQ) 
approach to study policy design, proxying the uncertainty by different discrete modes 
in a Markov chain, and by taking mode-dependent linear-quadratic approximations of 
the underlying model. This allows us to apply a powerful methodology with convenient 
solution algorithms that we have developed. We apply our methods to a benchmark 
new-Keynesian model, analyzing how policy is affected by uncertainty, and how 
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Our previous work develops methods to study optimal policy in Markov jump-linear-quadratic 
(MJLQ) models with forward-looking variables: models with conditionally linear dynamics and 
conditionally quadratic preferences, where the matrices in both preferences and dynamics are 
random (Svensson and Williams, 2007a, 2007b). In particular, each model has multiple “modes”—a 
finite collection of different possible values for the matrices, whose evolution is governed by a finite-
state Markov chain. In our previous work, we discuss how these modes could be structured to 
capture many different types of uncertainty relevant for policymakers. Here we put those 
suggestions into practice. We start by briefly discussing how an MJLQ model can be derived as a 
mode-dependent linear-quadratic approximation of an underlying nonlinear model, and we then 
apply our methods to a simple empirical mode-dependent New-Keynesian model of the U.S. economy, 
using a variant of a model by Lindé (2005). 
In Svensson and Williams (2007b), we study optimal policy design in MJLQ models when 
policymakers can or cannot observe the current mode, but we abstract from any learning and 
inference about the current mode. Although in many cases the optimal policy under no learning (NL) 
is not a normatively desirable policy, it serves as a useful benchmark for our later policy analyses. In 
Svensson and Williams (2007a), we focus on learning and inference in the more relevant situation, 
particularly for model-uncertainty applications in which the modes are not directly observable. Thus, 
decisionmakers must filter their observations to make inferences about the current mode. As in most 
Bayesian learning problems, the optimal policy typically includes an experimentation component 
reflecting the endogeneity of information. This class of problems has a long history in economics, and 
solutions are notoriously difficult to obtain. We developed algorithms to solve numerically for the 
optimal policy.1 Given the curse of dimensionality, the Bayesian optimal policy (BOP) is only feasible 
in relatively small models. Confronted with these difficulties, we also considered adaptive optimal 
policy (AOP).2 In this case, the policymaker in each period updates the probability distribution of the 
current mode in a Bayesian way, but the optimal policy is computed each period under the 
assumption that the policymaker will not learn from observations in the future. In our setting, the 
AOP is significantly easier to compute, and in many cases it provides a good approximation to the 
BOP. Moreover, the AOP analysis is of some interest in its own right, as it is closely related to 
specifications of adaptive learning that have been widely studied in macroeconomics.3 The AOP 
specification also rules out the experimentation that some may view as objectionable in a policy 
context.4 
In this paper, we apply our methodology to study optimal monetary policy design under 
uncertainty in dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models. We begin by summarizing 
the main findings from our previous work, leading to implementable algorithms for analyzing policy 
in MJLQ models. We then turn to analyzing optimal policy in DSGE models. To quantify the gains 
from experimentation, we focus on a small empirical benchmark New-Keynesian model. In this 
model, we compare and contrast optimal policies under no learning, AOP, and BOP. We analyze 
whether learning is beneficial—it is not always so, a fact that at least partially reflects our 
                                                       
1. In addition to the classic literature (on such problems as a monopolist learning its demand curve), Wieland (2000, 
2006) and Beck and Wieland (2002) examine Bayesian optimal policy and optimal experimentation in a context similar to ours 
but without forward-looking variables. Tesfaselassie, Schaling, and Eijffinger (2006) examine passive and active learning in a 
simple model with a forward-looking element in the form of a long interest rate in the aggregate demand equation. Ellison 
and Valla (2001) and Cogley, Colacito, and Sargent (2007) study situations like ours, but their expectational component is as 
in the Lucas supply curve (Et–1πt, for example) rather than our forward-looking case (Etπt+1, for example). More closely related 
to our present paper, Ellison (2006) analyzes active and passive learning in a New-Keynesian model with uncertainty about 
the slope of the Phillips curve. 
2. The literature also refers to optimal policy under no learning, adaptive optimal policy, and Bayesian optimal policy as 
myopia, passive learning, and active learning, respectively. 
3. See Evans and Honkapohja (2001) for an overview.  
4. AOP is also useful for technical reasons, as it gives us a good starting point for our more intensive numerical 
calculations in the BOP case.    
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assumption of symmetric information between the policymakers and the public—and then quantify 
the additional gains from experimentation.5 
Since we typically find that the gains from experimentation are small, the rest of the paper 
focuses on our adaptive optimal policy, which shuts down the experimentation channel. As the AOP 
is much easier to compute, this allows us to work with much larger and more empirically relevant 
policy models. In the latter part of the paper, we analyze one such model, an estimated forward-
looking model that is a mode-dependent variant of Lindé (2005). There, we focus on how optimal 
policy should respond to uncertainty about the degree to which agents are forward-looking, and we 
show that there are substantial gains from learning in this framework. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the MJLQ framework and summarizes our 
earlier work. Section 3 presents our analysis of learning and experimentation in a simple benchmark 
New-Keynesian model, and section 4 presents our analysis in an estimated empirical New-
Keynesian model. Section 5 presents some conclusions and suggestions for further work. 
 
 
2. MJLQ ANALYSIS OF OPTIMAL POLICY 
 
This section summarizes our earlier work (Svensson and Williams, 2007a, 2007b). We start by 
describing our MJLQ model and then briefly discuss approximate MJLQ models. Finally, we explore 
the three types of optimal policies considered: optimal policy with no learning, adaptive optimal 
policy, and Bayesian optimal policy.  
 
2.1 An MJLQ Model 
 
We consider an MJLQ model of an economy with forward-looking variables. The economy has a 
private sector and a policymaker. We let Xt denote an nX vector of predetermined variables in period 
t, xt an nx vector of forward-looking variables, and it an ni vector of policymaker instruments (control 
variables).6 We let model uncertainty be represented by nj possible modes and let jt ∈ Nj ≡ {1, 2, …, 
nj} denote the mode in period t. The model of the economy can then be written  
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where εt is a multivariate normally distributed random i.i.d. nε vector of shocks with mean zero and 
contemporaneous covariance matrix




. The matrices A11j,  A12j, …, C2j have the appropriate 
dimensions and depend on the mode j. Given that a structural model here is simply a collection of 
                                                       
5. In addition to our own previous work, MJLQ models have been widely studied in the control-theory literature for the 
special case in which the model modes are observable and there are no forward-looking variables (see Costa, Fragoso, and 
Marques, 2005, and the references therein). Do Val and Basar (1999) provide an application of an adaptive-control MJLQ 
problem in economics. Zampolli (2006) uses such an MJLQ model to examine monetary policy under shifts between regimes 
with and without an asset-market bubble. Blake and Zampolli (2006) extend the MJLQ model with observable modes to 
include forward-looking variables and present an algorithm for the solution of an equilibrium resulting from optimization 
under discretion. Svensson and Williams (2007b) provide a more general extension of the MJLQ framework with forward-
looking variables and present algorithms for the solution of an equilibrium resulting from optimization under commitment in 
a timeless perspective, as well as arbitrary time-varying or time-invariant policy rules, using the recursive saddlepoint 
method of Marcet and Marimon (1998). That paper also provides two concrete examples: an estimated backward-looking 
model (a three-mode variant of Rudebusch and Svensson, 1999) and an estimated forward-looking model (a three-mode 
variant of Lindé, 2005). Svensson and Williams (2007b) also extend the MJLQ framework to the more realistic case of 
unobservable modes, although without introducing learning and inference about the probability distribution of modes. 
Svensson and Williams (2007a) focus on learning and experimentation in the MJLQ framework. 
6. The first component of Xt may be unity, to allow for mode-dependent intercepts in the model equations.    
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matrices, each mode can represent a different model of the economy. Thus, uncertainty about the 
prevailing mode is model uncertainty.7 
The matrices on the right-hand side of equation (1) depend on the mode jt+1 in period t + 1, 
whereas the matrices on the right-hand side of equation (2) depend on the mode jt in period t. 
Equation (1) then determines the predetermined variables in period t + 1 as a function of the mode 
and shocks in period t +  1 and the predetermined variables, forward-looking variables, and 
instruments in period t. Equation (2) determines the forward-looking variables in period t as a 
function of the mode and shocks in period t, the expectations in period t of the next period’s mode and 
forward-looking variables, and the predetermined variables and instruments in period t. The matrix 
A22j is nonsingular for each j ∈ Nj. 
The mode jt follows a Markov process with the transition matrix P ≡ [Pjk].8 The shocks εt have 
mean zero and are i.i.d. with probability density ϕ, and we assume, without loss of generality, that εt 
is independent of jt.9 We also assume that C1jεt and C2kεt are independent for all j, k ∈ Nj. These 
shocks, along with the modes, are the driving forces in the model. They are not directly observed. For 
technical reasons, it is convenient but not necessary that they are independent. We let 






t ′ )  denote the true probability distribution of jt in period t. We let pt+τ⏐t  denote the 
policymaker’s and private sector’s estimate in the beginning of period t of the probability distribution 
in period t + τ. The prediction equation for the probability distribution is 
 
     
pt+1|t = ′ P pt|t .  (3) 
 
We let the operator Et[⋅] in the expression 






t+1  on the left-hand side of equation (2) denote 
expectations in period t, conditional on the policymaker’s and the private sector’s information in the 
beginning of period t, including Xt, it, and pt⏐t, but excluding jt and εt. The maintained assumption is 
thus symmetric information between the policymaker and the (aggregate) private sector. Since 
forward-looking variables will be allowed to depend on jt, parts of the private sector—but not the 
aggregate private sector—may be able to observe jt and parts of εt. While we focus on the 
determination of the optimal policy instrument it, our results also show how private sector choices as 
embodied in xt are affected by uncertainty and learning. The precise informational assumptions and 
the determination of pt⏐t are specified below. 
We let the policymaker’s intertemporal loss function in period t be 
 










t+τ ( ),  (4) 
 
where δ is a discount factor satisfying 0 < δ < 1, and the period loss, L(Xt, xt, it, jt), satisfies  
 















































                                                       
7. See also Svensson and Williams (2007b), where we show how many different types of uncertainty can be mapped into 
our MJLQ framework. 
8. Obvious special cases are 




, when the modes are completely persistent, and 
     
P
j. = ′ p , (j ∈ Nj), when the 
modes are serially i.i.d. with probability distribution  p . 
9. We can still incorporate additive mode-dependent shocks since the models allow mode-dependent intercepts (as well as 
mode-dependent standard deviations).    
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where the matrix Wj (j ∈ Nj) is positive semidefinite. We assume that the policymaker optimizes 
under commitment in a timeless perspective. As explained below, we then add the term  
 










t   (6) 
 
to the intertemporal loss function in period t. As we show below, the nx vector Ξt–1 is the vector of 
Lagrange multipliers for equation (2) from the optimization problem in period t – 1. For the special 
case in which there are no forward-looking variables (nx = 0), the model consists of equation (1) only, 
without the term 
     
A12 j
t+1
xt ; the period loss function depends on Xt, it, and jt only; and there is no role 
for the Lagrange multipliers Ξt–1 or the term in equation (6). 
 
2.2 Approximate MJLQ Models 
 
While in this paper we start with an MJLQ model, the usual formulations of economic models are 
not of this type. However, the same type of approximation methods that are widely used to convert 
nonlinear models into their linear counterparts can also convert nonlinear models into MJLQ 
models. We analyze this issue in Svensson and Williams (2007b) and present an illustration, as well. 
Here we briefly discuss the main ideas. Rather than analyzing local deviations from a single steady 
state as in conventional linearizations, for an MJLQ approximation we analyze the local deviations 
from (potentially) separate, mode-dependent steady states. Standard linearizations are justified as 
asymptotically valid for small shocks, since an increasing time is spent in the vicinity of the steady 
state. Our MJLQ approximations are asymptotically valid for small shocks and persistent modes, 
since an increasing time is spent in the vicinity of each mode-dependent steady state. Thus, for 
slowly varying Markov chains, our MJLQ models provide accurate approximations of nonlinear 
models with Markov switching. 
 
2.3 Types of Optimal Policies 
 
We distinguish three cases: optimal policy when there is no learning (NL), adaptive optimal 
policy (AOP), and Bayesian optimal policy (BOP). By NL, we refer to a situation in which the 
policymaker and the aggregate private sector have a probability distribution pt⏐t over the modes in 
period t and update the probability distribution in future periods using the transition matrix only, so 
the updating equation is 
 
     
p
t+1|t+1 = ′ P p
t | t.  (7) 
 
That is, the policymaker and the private sector do not use observations of the variables in the 
economy to update the probability distribution. The policymaker then determines optimal policy in 
period t conditional on pt⏐t and equation (7). This is a variant of a case examined in Svensson and 
Williams (2007b). 
By AOP, we refer to a situation in which the policymaker in period t determines optimal policy as 
in the NL case, but then uses observations of the realization of the variables in the economy to 
update its probability distribution according to Bayes’ theorem. In this case, the instruments will 
generally have an effect on the updating of future probability distributions, and through this channel 
they separately affect the intertemporal loss. However, the policymaker does not exploit that channel 
in determining optimal policy. That is, the policymaker does not do any conscious experimentation. 
By BOP, we refer to a situation in which the policymaker acknowledges that the current instruments 
will affect future inference and updating of the probability distribution and takes this separate 
channel into account when calculating optimal policy. BOP thus includes optimal experimentation,    
5 
whereby the policymaker may, for instance, pursue policy that increases losses in the short run but 
improves the inference of the probability distribution and therefore lowers losses in the longer run. 
 
Optimal Policy with No Learning 
 
We first consider the NL case. Svensson and Williams (2007b) derive the equilibrium under 
commitment in a timeless perspective for the case in which Xt, xt, and it are observable in period t, jt 
is unobservable, and the updating equation for pt⏐t is given by equation (7). Observations of Xt, xt, 
and it are then not used to update pt⏐t. 
It is useful to replace equation (2) by the two equivalent equations, 
 































where we introduce the nx vector of additional forward-looking variables, zt. Introducing this vector 
is a practical way of keeping track of the expectations term on the left-hand side of equation (2). 
Furthermore, it is practical to use equation (9) to solve xt as a function of Xt, zt, it, jt, and εt:  
 
() ( )
− ≡− − − 
1
22 21 2 2 =, , , , tt t t t tj t j t j t j t tt t t j xx X z i A zAXB iC εε . (10) 
 
For a given jt, this function is linear in Xt, zt, it, and εt. 
To solve for the optimal decisions, we use the recursive saddlepoint method.10 We thus introduce 
Lagrange multipliers for each forward-looking equation, the lagged values of which become state 
variables and reflect costs of commitment, while the current values become control variables. The 
dual period loss function can be written 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ≡ϕ ∑ ∫
 
| E, , , , , , , , , , tt t t t t t j t t t t t t tt t
j
Lj p Lj d Xzi Xzi γε γ εε ε , 
 
where  − ′′ ′ ≡Ξ 
1 (,) tt t XX  is the (nX + nx) vector of extended predetermined variables (that is, including 
the nx vector, Ξt–1), γt is an nx vector of Lagrange multipliers, and ϕ(⋅) denotes a generic probability 
density function (for εt, the standard normal density function), and where 
 





,,,,, , ,,,, ,, ,,,, t tt ttt t t tttt tt t t t j t tttt t Lj L j j Hj Xzi XxXzi i z xXzi γε ε γ Ξ ε . (11) 
 
As discussed in Svensson and Williams (2007b), the failure of the law of iterated expectations 
leads us to introduce a collection of value functions,     ˆ V (st, j), which condition on the mode, while the 
value function   V (st) averages over these and represents the solution of the dual optimization 
problem. The somewhat unusual Bellman equation for the dual problem can be written 
 
                                                       
10. See Marcet and Marimon (1998), Svensson and Williams (2007b), and Svensson (2007) for details of the recursive 
saddlepoint method.     
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| (, ) ′ ≡ 
tt t t p sX  denotes the perceived state of the economy (it includes the perceived 
probability distribution, pt⏐t, but not the true mode) and (st, jt) denotes the true state of the economy 
(it includes the true mode of the economy). As we discuss in more detail below, it is necessary to 
include the mode jt in the state vector because the beliefs do not satisfy the law of iterated 
expectations. In the BOP case, beliefs do satisfy this property, so the state vector is simply st. Also, in 
the Bellman equation we require that all the choice variables respect the information constraints, 
and they thus depend on the perceived state st but not directly on the mode j. 
The optimization is subject to the transition equation for Xt,  
 
( ) + + ++ + + ++ +  11 1 1 2 1 1 1 11 1 1 =, , , , t j tj t t t t tj t j t tt t t j XA X A x X z i B i C ε ε , (13) 
 
where we have substituted   x(Xt, zt, it, jt, εt) for xt; the new dual transition equation for Ξt, 
 
   
Ξ
t = γ
t ,  (14) 
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It is straightforward to see that the solution of the dual optimization problem (equation 12) is 
linear in  
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( ) ()() () ( ) ( ) || =, , , ,, , , , ≡≡ +    εε ε tt t t t t t t t t t t t x t t t t xX j jF p jF p j ε xx s x X z si s X . (17) 
 
This solution is also the solution to the original primal optimization problem. We note that xt is 
linear in εt for given pt⏐t and jt. The equilibrium transition equation is then given by  
 
     
s
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As can be easily verified, the (unconditional) dual value function   V (st) is quadratic in  
t X  for 
given pt⏐t, taking the form  
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The conditional dual value function     ˆ V (st, jt) gives the dual intertemporal loss conditional on the true 
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The function     ˆ V (st, jt) is also quadratic in  
t X  for given pt⏐t and jt,  
 
() () () ≡+  
|| ˆˆ ˆ ,, ,
'
tt t t tt t t tt XX Vj V p j w p j sX X . 
 
It follows that we have 
 
() ( ) ≡∑   
|| | ˆ , tt j tt tt XX XX j Vp p Vp j ; 
 
   
wp
t | t () ≡
j ∑ p
jt | t ˆ wp
t | t,j ( ). 
 
Although we find the optimal policies from the dual problem, we use the value function for the 
primal problem (with the original, unmodified loss function) to measure true expected losses. This 
value function, with the period loss function EtL(Xt, xt, it, jt) rather than Et  L ( 
t X , zt, it, γt, jt, εt), 
satisfies 
 

















=, , 0 .
tt tj t t j t t t t
j
tt j t t j t
j








where the second equality follows since x(st, jt, εt) is linear in εt for given st and jt. It is quadratic in 

t X  for given pt⏐t, 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ≡+   '
|| tt t t t t t XX VV p w p sX X , 
 
where the scalar w(pt⏐t) in the primal value function is identical to that in the dual value function. 
This is the value function conditional on  
t X  and pt⏐t after Xt has been observed but before xt has 
been observed, taking into account that jt and εt are not observed. Hence, the second term on the 
right-hand side of equation (19) contains the expectation of 





t  conditional on that information.11 
In Svensson and Williams (2007a, 2007b), we  present algorithms to compute the solution and 
the primal and dual value functions for the no-learning case. For future reference, we note that the 
value function for the primal problem also satisfies 
 
( ) ( ) ≡∑
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| , tj t t t j Vp V j ss , 
 
where the conditional value function, 
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V (st, jt), satisfies 
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Adaptive Optimal Policy 
 
Consider now the case of adaptive optimal policy, in which the policymaker uses the same policy 
function as in the no-learning case, but each period updates the probabilities on which this policy is 
conditioned. This case is thus simple to implement recursively, as we have already discussed how to 
solve for the optimal decisions and below we show how to update probabilities. However, the ex ante 
e v a l u a t i o n  o f  e x p e c t e d  l o s s  i s  m o r e  c o m p l e x ,  a s  w e  s h o w  b e l o w .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  w e  a s s u m e  t h a t  




≡ 0 and that both εt and jt are unobservable. The estimate pt⏐t is the result of Bayesian 
updating, using all information available, but the optimal policy in period t is computed under the 
perceived updating equation (7). That is, we disregard the fact that the policy choice will affect 
future pt+τ⏐t+τ and that future expected loss will change when pt+τ⏐ t+τ changes. Under the assumption 
that the expectations on the left-hand side of equation (2) are conditional on equation (7), the 
variables zt, it, γt, and xt in period t are still determined by equations (16) and (17). 
To determine the updating equation for pt⏐t, we specify an explicit sequence of information 
revelation as follows, in nine steps. The timing assumptions are necessary to spell out the 
appropriate conditioning for decisions and updating of beliefs. 
First, the policymaker and the private sector enter period t with the prior pt⏐t–1. They know Xt–1, 
xt–1 = x(st–1, jt–1, εt–1), zt–1 = z(st–1), it–1 = i(st–1), and Ξt–1 = γ(st–1) from the previous period. 
Second, the mode jt and the vector of shocks εt are realized in the beginning of period t. The 
vector of predetermined variables Xt is then realized according to equation (1). 
Third, the policymaker and the private sector observe Xt. They then know that − ′ ′ ≡Ξ 
1 (, )
'
tt t XX . 
They do not observe jt or εt. 
                                                       
11. To be precise, the observation of Xt, which depends on 





t , allows some inference of εt, εt⏐t. The variable xt will 
depend on jt and on εt, but on εt only through 





t . By assumption, C1jεt and C2kεt are independent. Hence, any observation 
of Xt and C1jεt does not convey any information about C2jεt, so 






t =0.    
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Fourth, the policymaker and the private sector update the prior pt⏐t–1 to the posterior pt⏐t 
according to Bayes’ theorem and the updating equation 
 
     
p













t | t−1 ()
p
jt | t−1, j ∈N
j () , (21) 
 
where again ϕ(⋅) denotes a generic density function.12 Then the policymaker and the private sector 
know that  ′′ ≡  '
| (,) tt t t p sX . 
Fifth, the policymaker solves the dual optimization problem, determines it = i(st), and 
implements or announces the instrument setting it. 
Sixth, the private sector and policymaker form their expectations,  
 
     
zt =E tH jt+1








In equilibrium, these expectations will be determined by equation (16). These expectations are by 
assumption formed before xt is observed. The private sector and the policymaker know that xt will, in 
equilibrium, be determined in the next step according to equation (17). Hence, they can form 
expectations of the soon-to-be determined xt conditional on jt = j,13  
 
     
x
jt | t = xs
t,j,0 ( ).  (22) 
 
The private sector and the policymaker can also infer Ξt from 
 
     
Ξ
t = γ s
t ( ).  (23) 
 
This allows the private sector and the policymaker to form the expectations  
 
     










                                                       
12. The policymaker and private sector can also estimate the shocks εt⏐t as εt⏐t = Σjpjt⏐tεjt⏐t, where εjt⏐t ≡ Xt – A11jXt–1 – A12jxt–
1 – B1jit–1 (j ∈ Nj). However, because of the assumed independence of C1jεt and C2kεt, j, k ∈ Nj, we do not need to keep track of 
εjt⏐t. 
13. Note that 0 instead of εjt⏐t enters above. The inference εjt⏐t above is inference about C1jεt, whereas xt depends on εt  
through C2jεt. Since we assume that C1jεt and C2jεt are independent, there is no inference of C2jεt from observing Xt. Hence, 






t ≡ 0. Because of the linearity of xt in εt, the integration of xt over εt  results in x(st, jt, 0t).    
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and where we have exploited the linearity of xt = x(st, jt, εt) and xt+1 = x(st+1, jt+1, εt+1) in εt and εt+1. 
Under AOP, zt is formed conditional on the belief that the probability distribution in period t + 1 will 
be given by pt+1⏐t+1 = P′pt⏐t, not by the true updating equation that we are about to specify. 
Seventh, after the expectations zt have been formed, xt is determined as a function of Xt, zt, it, jt, 
and εt by equation (10). 
Eighth, the policymaker and the private sector then use the observed xt to update pt⏐t to the new 
posterior 
   
p
t | t
+  according to Bayes’ theorem, via the updating equation 
 
















t | t ()
p
jt | t, j ∈N
j () . (25) 
 
Ninth, the policymaker and the private sector then leave period t and enter period t + 1 with the 
prior pt+1⏐t given by the prediction equation 
 
     
p
t+1|t = ′ P p
t | t
+.  (26) 
 
In the beginning of period t + 1, the mode jt+1 and the vector of shocks εt+1 are realized, and Xt+1 is 
determined by equation (1) and observed by the policymaker and the private sector. The sequence of 
the nine steps above then repeats itself. For more detail on the explicit densities in the updating 
equations (21) and (25), see Svensson and Williams (2007a). 
The transition equation for pt+1⏐t+1 can be written 
 
     
p







t+1 ( ), (27) 
 
where Q(st, zt, it, jt, εt, jt+1, εt+1) is defined by the combination of equation (21) for period t + 1 with 
equations (13) and (26). The equilibrium transition equation for the full state vector is then given by 
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where the third row is given by the true updating equation (27) together with the policy function 
(16). Thus, in this AOP case, there is a distinction between the “perceived” transition equation (15) 
and the equilibrium transition equation (18), both of which include the perceived updating equation 
(7) in the bottom block, and the “true” equilibrium transition equation (28), which replaces the 
perceived updating equation (7) with the true updating equation (27). 
Note that V(st) in equation (19), which is subject to the perceived transition equation (15), does 
not give the true (unconditional) value function for the AOP case. This is instead given by  
 
( ) ( ) ≡∑

| , tj t t t j Vp V j ss , 
 
where the true conditional value function, 

V (st, jt), satisfies 
 
()
() ( ) ( )
() ()













t ttt t j
jk t t t k
Lj j
Vj d d j N
Vg j k k








That is, the true value function  V (st) takes into account the true updating equation for pt⏐t, 
equation (27), whereas the optimal policy, equation (16), and the perceived value function, V(st) in 
equation (19), are conditional on the perceived updating equation (7) and thereby the perceived 
transition equation (15). Also,  V (st) is the value function after  
t X  has been observed but before xt is 
observed, so it is conditional on pt⏐t rather than on 
   
p
t | t
+ . Since the full transition equation (28) is no 
longer linear given the belief updating in equation (27), the true value function  V (st) is no longer 
quadratic in  
t X  for given pt⏐t. Thus, more complex numerical methods are required to evaluate 
losses in the AOP case, although policy is still determined simply as in the NL case. 
As we discuss in Svensson and Williams (2007a), the difference between the true updating 
equation for pt+1⏐t+1, (27), and the perceived updating equation (7) is that in the true updating 
equation, pt+1⏐t+1 becomes a random variable from the point of view of period t, with mean equal to 
pt+1⏐t. This is because pt+1⏐t+1 depends on the realization of jt+1 and εt+1. Bayesian updating thus 
induces a mean-preserving spread over beliefs, which in turn sheds light on the gains from learning. 
If the conditional value function  V  (st, jt) under NL is concave in pt⏐t for given  
t X  and jt, then by 
Jensen’s inequality the true expected future loss under AOP will be lower than the true expected 
future loss under NL. That is, the concavity of the value function in beliefs means that learning leads 
to lower losses. While it is likely that  V  is indeed concave, as we show in applications, it need not be 
globally so, and thus learning need not always reduce losses. In some cases, the losses incurred by 
increased variability of beliefs may offset the expected precision gains. Furthermore, under BOP, it    
12 
may be possible to adjust policy so as to further increase the variance of pt⏐t, that is, to achieve a 
mean-preserving spread that might further reduce the expected future loss.14 This amounts to 
optimal experimentation. 
 
Bayesian Optimal Policy 
 
Finally, we consider the BOP case, in which optimal policy is determined while taking the 
updating equation (27) into account. That is, we now allow the policymaker to choose it taking into 
account that his actions will affect pt+1⏐t+1, which in turn will affect future expected losses. In 
particular, experimentation is allowed and is optimally chosen. Hence, for the BOP case, there is no 
distinction between the “perceived” and “true” transition equations. 
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Then the dual optimization problem can be written as equation (12) subject to the above transition 
equation (30). Matters simplify somewhat in the Bayesian case, however, as we do not need to 
compute the conditional value functions     ˆ V (st, jt), which were required in the AOP case given the 
failure of the law of iterated expectations. The second term on the right-hand side of equation (12) 
can be written as  
 














Since, in the Bayesian case, the beliefs do satisfy the law of iterated expectations, this is then the 
same as  
 
() () ++ + ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤
⎢⎥ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦

11 1 ˆ E, = E . tt t t t Vj V ss s s  
 
See Svensson and Williams (2007a) for a proof. 
Thus, the dual Bellman equation for the Bayesian optimal policy is 
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14. Kiefer (1989)  examines the properties of a value function, including concavity, under Bayesian learning for a simpler 
model without forward-looking variables.    
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where the transition equation is given by equation (30). 
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Because of the nonlinearity of equations (27) and (30), the solution is no longer linear in  
t X  for given 
pt⏐t. The dual value function,   V (st), is no longer quadratic in  
t X  for given pt⏐t. The value function of 
the primal problem, V(st), is given by, equivalently, equation (19); equation (29) with the equilibrium 
transition equation (28) and with the solution (32); or  
 



























t () ϕ ε
t+1 () dε
tdε
t+1 . (34)   
 
It it is also no longer quadratic in  
t X  for given pt⏐t. More complex and detailed numerical methods 
are thus necessary in this case to find the optimal policy and the value function. Therefore, little can 
be said in general about the solution of the problem. Nonetheless, in numerical analysis it is very 
useful to have a good starting guess at a solution, which here comes from the AOP case. In our 




3. LEARNING AND EXPERIMENTATION IN A SIMPLE NEW-KEYNESIAN MODEL 
 
We consider the benchmark standard New-Keynesian model, consisting of a New-Keynesian 
Phillips curve and a consumption Euler equation:15  
 










πt ;  (35) 
 














t ; (36) 
 




g,t+1 .  (37) 
 





 is a 






                                                       
15.  See Woodford (2003) for an exposition.     
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is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. There are three shocks in the model: two unobservable 
shocks, επt and εyt, which are independent standard normal random variables, and the observable 
serially correlated shock, gt. This last shock is interpretable as a demand shock coming from 
variation in preferences, government spending, or the underlying efficient level of output. Woodford 
(2003) combines and renormalizes these shocks into a composite shock representing variation in the 
natural rate of interest. 
I n  t h e  s t a n d a r d  f o r m u l a t i o n s  o f  t h i s  m o d e l ,  the shocks are observable and policy responds 
directly to the shocks. However, some components of the shocks need to be unobservable in order for 











, vary with the mode, jt. For the former, this could 
reflect changes in the degree of monopolistic competition (which also lead to varying markups) or 
changes in the degree of price stickiness. The interest sensitivity shift is purely a change in the 
preferences of the agents in the economy, although it could also result from nonhomothetic 
preferences coupled with shifts in output (in which case the preferences themselves would not shift, 
but the intertemporal elasticity would vary with the level of output). Unlike our illustration above, 
there are no switches in the steady-state levels of the variables of interest here, as we consider the 
usual approximations around a zero inflation rate and an efficient level of output. 
 
3.1 Optimal Policy: No Learning, Adaptive Optimal Policy, and Bayesian Optimal 
Policy 
 
Here we examine value functions and optimal policies for this simple New-Keynesian model 
under no learning (NL), adaptive optimal policy (AOP), and Bayesian optimal policy (BOP). We use 
the following loss function:  
 









2 .  (38) 
 
We set the following parameters, mostly following Woodford’s (2003) calibration, as follows: 
γ1 = 0.024, γ2 = 0.075, σ1 = 1.000/0.157 = 6.370, σ2 = 1.0, cπ = cy = cg = 0.5, and ρ = 0.5. We set the loss 
function parameters as: δ = 0.99, λj = 2γj, and μ = 0.236. Most of the structural parameters are taken 
from Woodford (2003), while the two modes represent reasonable alternatives. Mode 1 is Woodford’s 
benchmark case; mode 2 has a substantially smaller interest rate sensitivity (one consistent with 
logarithmic preferences) and a larger response, γ, of inflation to output. We set the transition matrix 
to  
 











We have two forward-looking variables, xt ≡ (πt, yt)′, and consequently two Lagrange multipliers, 
Ξt–1  ≡ ( Ξπ,t–1,  Ξy,t–1)′. We have one predetermined variable (Xt  ≡  gt) and the estimated mode 
probabilities, pt⏐t ≡ (p1t⏐t, p2t⏐t)′ (of which we only need keep track of one, p1t⏐t). Thus, the value and 
policy functions, V(st) and i(st), are all four dimensional: st = (gt, Ξ′t–1, p1t⏐t)′. We are therefore forced 
for computational reasons to restrict attention to relatively sparse grids with few points. The 
following plots show two-dimensional slices of the value and policy functions, focusing on the 
dependence on gt and p1t⏐t (which we for simplicity denote by p1t in the figures). In particular, all of 
the plots are for Ξt–1 = (0, 0)′. Figure 1 shows losses under NL and BOP as functions of p1t and gt. 
Figure 2 shows the difference between losses under NL, AOP, and BOP. Figures 3 and 4 show the 
corresponding policy functions and their differences. 
In Svensson and Williams (2007a) we show that learning implies a mean-preserving spread of 
the random variable pt+1⏐t+1 (which under learning is a random variable from the vantage point of    
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period  t ). Hence, concavity of the value function under NL in p1t implies that learning is beneficial, 
since then a mean-preserving spread reduces the expected future loss. However, figure 1 illustrates 
that the value function is actually slightly convex in p1t, so learning is not beneficial here. In 
contrast, the value function is concave and learning is beneficial in a backward-looking example in 
Svensson and Williams (2007a). 
Consequently, AOP gives higher losses than NL, as shown in figure 2. Furthermore, somewhat 
surprisingly, BOP gives higher losses than AOP (although the difference is very small). This is all 
counter to an example with a backward-looking model in Svensson and Williams (2007a). 
Why is this different in a model with forward-looking variables? It may at least partially be a 
remnant of our assumption of symmetric beliefs and information between the private sector and the 
policymaker. Backward-looking models generally find that learning is beneficial. Moreover, with 
backward-looking models, the BOP is always weakly better than the AOP, as acknowledging the 
endogeneity of information in the BOP case need not mean that policy must change. (That is, the 
AOP policy is always feasible in the BOP problem.) Neither of these conclusions holds with forward-
looking models. Under our assumption of symmetric information and beliefs between the private 
sector and the policymaker, both the private sector and the policymaker learn. The difference then 
comes from the way that private sector beliefs also respond to learning and to the experimentation 
motive. Having more reactive private sector beliefs may add volatility and make it more difficult for 
the policymaker to stabilize the economy. Acknowledging the endogeneity of information in the BOP 
case then need not be beneficial either, as it may induce further volatility in agents’ beliefs.16  
 
 
4. LEARNING IN AN ESTIMATED EMPIRICAL NEW-KEYNESIAN MODEL 
 
The previous section focused on a simple small model to explore the impacts of learning and 
experimentation. Since computing BOP is computationally intensive, there are limits to the degree of 
empirical realism of the models we can address in that framework. In this section, we focus on a 
more empirically plausible model, using a version of Lindé’s (2005) model that we estimated in 
Svensson and Williams (2007b). This model includes richer dynamics for inflation and the output 
gap, which both have backward- and forward-looking components. However, these additional 
dynamics increase the dimension of the state space, which implies that it is not very feasible to 
consider the BOP. We therefore focus on the impact of learning on policy and compare NL and AOP. 
In Svensson and Williams (2007b), we computed the optimal policy under no learning, and here we 
see how inference on the mode affects the dynamics of output, inflation, and interest rates. 
 
4.1 The Model 
 
The structural model is a mode-dependent simplification of Lindé’s (2005) model of the U.S. 
economy and is given by  
 











πt ; (39) 
 
   
yt = β fjEtyt+1 + 1− β fj () βyjyt−1 + 1− βyj () yt−2 ⎡
⎣
⎤
⎦− βrj it − Etπt+1 ( )+ cyjε yt . 
 
Here j ∈{1, 2} indexes the mode, and the shocks, επt, εyt, and εit, are independent standard normal 
random variables. In particular, we consider a two-mode MJLQ model in which one mode has 
forward- and backward-looking elements and the other is backward-looking only. Thus we specify 
that mode 1 is unrestricted, while in mode 2 we restrict ωf = βf = 0, so that the mode is backward-
                                                       
16. In the forward-looking case, we solve saddlepoint problems, and moving from AOP to BOP expands the feasible set for 
both the minimizing and maximizing choices.     
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looking. For estimation, we also impose a particular instrument rule for it, but we do not include that 
here since our focus is on optimal policy. 
In Svensson and Williams (2007b), we estimate the model on U.S. data using Bayesian methods. 
The maximum posterior estimates are given in table 1, with the unconditional expectation of the 
coefficients for comparison. Apart from the forward-looking terms (which are restricted), the 
variation in the other parameters across the modes is relatively minor. There are some differences in 
the estimated policy functions (not reported here), but relatively little change across modes in the 
other structural coefficients. The estimated transition matrix P and its implied stationary 
distribution  p are given by  
 



















Mode 2 is thus the most persistent and has the largest mass in the invariant distribution. This is 
consistent with our estimation of the modes, as shown in figure 5. Again, the plots show both the 
smoothed and filtered estimates. Mode 2, the backward-looking model mode, was experienced the 
most throughout much of the sample, holding for 1961–68 and then, with near certainty, continually 
since 1985. The forward-looking model held in periods of rapid changes in inflation, holding for both 
the run-ups in inflation in the early and late 1970s and the disinflationary period of the early 1980s. 
During periods of relative tranquility, such as the Greenspan era, the backward-looking model fits 
the data the best. 
 
4.2 Optimal Policy:  No Learning and Adaptive Optimal Policy 
 
Using the methods described above, we solve for the optimal policy functions  
 
() | =, 
ti t t t iF pX  
 
where now  −−− −π − − ′ ≡π Ξ Ξ 
1 1 2 1 ,1 ,1 (,,, , , ) tt t t t t y t Xy y i . In Svensson and Williams (2007b), we focus on the 
observable and no-learning cases, and we assume that the shocks επt and εyt are observable. We thus 
set  C2  ≡ 0 and treat the shocks as additional predetermined variables. To focus on the role of 
learning, we now assume that those shocks are unobservable. If they were observable, then agents 
would be able to infer the mode from their observations of the forward-looking variables. We use the 
following loss function: 
 












which is a common central bank loss function. We set the weights to λ = 1 and ν = 0.2, and fix the 
discount factor in the intertemporal loss function to δ = 1. 
For ease of interpretation, we plot the distribution of the impulse responses of inflation, the 
output gap, and the instrument rate to the two structural shocks in figure 6. We consider 10,000 
simulations of fifty periods, and we plot the median responses for the optimal policy under NL and 
AOP and the corresponding optimal responses for the constant-coefficient model.17 
Compared with the constant-coefficient case, the mean impulse responses are consistent with 
larger effects of the shocks that are also longer lasting. In terms of the optimal policy responses, the 
AOP and NL cases are quite similar, and in both cases the peak response to shocks is nearly the 
                                                       
17. The shocks are επ0 = 1 and εy0 = 1, respectively, so the shocks to the inflation and output-gap equations in period 0 are 
mode dependent and equal to cπj and cyj (j = 1, 2, 3), respectively. The distribution of modes in period 0 (and thereby all 
periods) is again the stationary distribution.    
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same as in the constant-coefficient case, but it comes with a delay. Again compared with the 
constant-coefficient case, the responses of inflation and the output gap are larger and more sustained 
when there is model uncertainty. 
Learning can be beneficial, however, as the optimal policy under AOP dampens the responses to 
shocks, particularly for shocks to inflation. Since the optimal policy responses are nearly identical, 
this seems to be largely due to more accurate forecasts by the public, which lead to more rapid 
stabilization. 
While these impulse responses are revealing, they do not capture the full benefits of learning, as 
by definition they simply provide the responses to a single shock. To gain a better understanding of 
the role of learning, we simulated our model under the NL and AOP policies to compare the realized 
economic performance. Table 2 summarizes various statistics resulting from a thousand simulations 
of a thousand periods each. Thus, for example, the entry for the average πt is the average across the 
thousand simulations of the sample average (over the thousand periods) of inflation, while the 
standard deviation of πt is the average across simulations of the standard deviation (in each time 
series) of inflation. In the table, the average period loss (Lt) under AOP is less than half that under 
NL. Figure 7 plots the distribution across samples of the key components of the loss function. There 
we plot a kernel smoothed estimate of the distribution from the thousand simulations. The figure 
shows that the distribution of sample losses is much more favorable under AOP than under NL. 
In figure 8 we show one representative simulation to illustrate the differences. The figure reveals 
that the stabilization of inflation and the output gap are more effective under AOP than NL for very 





In this paper, we have presented a relatively general framework for analyzing model uncertainty 
and the interactions between learning and optimization. While this is a classic issue, very little has 
been done to date for systems with forward-looking variables, which are essential elements of 
modern models for policy analysis. Our specification is general enough to cover many practical cases 
of interest, yet remains relatively tractable in implementation. This is definitely true when 
decisionmakers do not learn from the data they observe (our case of no learning, NL) or when they do 
learn but do not account for learning in optimization (our case of adaptive optimal policy, AOP). In 
both of these cases, we have developed efficient algorithms for solving for the optimal policy, which 
can handle relatively large models with multiple modes and many state variables. However, in the 
case of the Bayesian optimal policy (BOP), which takes the experimentation motive into account, we 
must solve more complex numerical dynamic programming problems. Thus to fully examine optimal 
experimentation, we are haunted by the curse of dimensionality, forcing us to study relatively small 
and simple models. 
An issue of much practical importance is the size of the experimentation component of policy and 
the losses entailed in abstracting from it. While our results in this paper are far from comprehensive, 
they suggest that the experimentation motive may not be a concern in practical settings. The above 
and similar examples that we have considered indicate that the benefits of learning (moving from 
NL to AOP) may be substantial, whereas the benefits from experimentation (moving from AOP to 
BOP) are modest or even insignificant. If this preliminary finding stands up to scrutiny, 
experimentation in economic policy in general and monetary policy in particular may not be very 
beneficial, in which case there is little need to face the difficult ethical and other issues involved in 
conscious experimentation in economic policy. Furthermore, the AOP is much easier to compute and 
implement than the BOP. More simulations and cases need to be examined for this to truly be a 
robust implication. 
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Table 1. Estimates of the Constant-Coefficient Model and a Restricted Two-Mode Lindé 
Model 
 
Parameter   Mean  Mode 1  Mode 2 
ωf  0.0938 0.3272 0.0000 
γ  0.0474 0.0580 0.0432 
βf  0.1375 0.4801 0.0000 
βr  0.0304 0.0114 0.0380 
βy  1.3331 1.5308 1.2538 
cπ  0.8966 1.0621 0.8301 






Table 2. Average of Different Statistics under No Learning and the Adaptive Optimal 
Policya 
 
  πt   y t    it   L t 
Policy  Average  Std. dev.    Average  Std. dev.    Average Std.  dev.  Average 
NL   –0.1165  5.2057    0.1303  5.6003    0.0073 10.0239    88.4867 
AOP   –0.0300  3.1696    0.0299  2.7698    0.0011 9.9989    38.8710 
 
a. The table presents the average value and average standard deviation of each variable from one thousand simulations 
of one thousand periods each of our estimated model under the no learning (NL) and under the adaptive optimal policy (AOP).  
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Figure 2. Differences in Losses from No Learning (NL), Adaptive Optimal Policy (AOP), 
and Bayesian Optimal Policy (BOP) 
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Figure 6. Unconditional Impulse Responses to Shocks under the Optimal Policy for the 





a. In the figure, solid lines represent the median responses under AOP, dashed lines represent the median responses 
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Figure 7. Distribution across Samples of Various Statistics under the Optimal Policy for 





a. In the figure, solid lines denote AOP, while dashed lines represent NL. 
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Figure 8. Simulated Time Series under the Optimal Policy for the Two-Mode Version of 





a. In panels A, B, and C, solid lines denote AOP, while dashed lines graph NL. In panel D, the solid line represents the 
probability of mode 1, the dotted line represents the true mode, and the dashed line represents the unconditional probability 
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